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Jasper Krommendijk*  
This article analyses the impact and effectiveness of the most important international monitoring 
mechanism for New Zealand's international human rights obligations, which is the process of State 
reporting under United Nations human rights treaties by committees of experts. This article 
concludes that the organisation of this process in New Zealand has improved since the mid-2000s 
and that domestic actors, such as the New Zealand Human Rights Commission and non-
governmental organisations, have become more involved. There is, however, no structural follow-up 
to the recommendations of the supervisory United Nations committees, and as a result they often 
remain largely ineffective. This article will explain why the reporting process under the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is considerably more effective.  
Former Minister of Justice, the Hon Simon Power, stated that New Zealand's "record on human 
rights is among the best in the world".1 Likewise, the New Zealand Human Rights Commission 
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of a more extensive PhD research project that is being conducted from November 2009 until March 2014 
and that focuses on the impact and effectiveness of State reporting in the Netherlands, New Zealand and 
Finland. The author was a visiting researcher at Victoria University of Wellington in June 2012. He would 
like to thank Dr Petra Butler, Dr Bevan Marten, Professor Janet McLean and Peter Shuttleworth for their 
valuable comments on an earlier version. All errors remain the author's sole responsibility. A separate article 
will be published about the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women: 
Jasper Krommendijk "Just 'a little UN Committee' or important policy driver? The impact and effectiveness 
of the CEDAW Committee in New Zealand" Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies (translation: Journal for Gender 
Studies) (forthcoming). 
1  Hon Simon Power, former Minister of Justice "Speech to Bill of Rights Act Symposium" (Wellington, 11 
November 2010).  
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(NZHRC) concluded that "New Zealand meets international human rights standards in many 
respects, and often surpasses them".2 International human rights standards are to be found in United 
Nations (UN) human rights treaties (HRTs).3 All State parties are required to submit periodically – 
usually every four or five years – a report on the implementation of each treaty.4 This report is 
examined by an independent committee of experts (a treaty body (TB)), through a so-called 
constructive dialogue with representatives of the State party. Members of civil society and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are allowed to submit alternative information to the TB in 
shadow reports. The assessment of the State report ends with the adoption of legally non-binding 
concluding observations (COs), which contain suggestions and recommendations for improved 
implementation of the treaty standards.  
  
2  This conclusion was reached by the New Zealand Human Rights Commission [NZHRC] in 2004 after an 
extensive study and consultation about the state of human rights in New Zealand: NZHRC Human Rights in 
New Zealand Today: Ngā Tika Tangata O Te Motu (September 2004) at ch 21. Not surprisingly, this finding 
was subsequently endorsed by the Government: Fifth periodic reports of States parties: New Zealand 
CCPR/C/NZL/5 (2008) at [5]. 
3  The six main human rights treaties [HRTs] for New Zealand, which are also the focus of this article, are the 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination 660 UNTS 195 (opened for signature 
21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) [CERD]; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 
[ICCPR]; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR]; the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1249 UNTS 13 (opened for signature 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) [CEDAW]; the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 
December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) [CAT]; and the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 
[UNCROC]. The article does not address the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2515 
UNTS 3 (opened for signature 30 March 2007, entered into force 3 May 2008) [CRPD], which was ratified 
only very recently on 26 September 2008. The initial State report of March 2011 has not been considered by 
the CRPD Committee and there are hence no concluding observations [COs] yet: see First New Zealand 
Report on Implementing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  
CRPD/C/NZL/1 (2011). Due to word limitations this article will not address the universal periodic review 
[UPR] of the United Nations [UN] Human Rights Council, a peer review mechanism whereby member 
States scrutinise each others' domestic human rights situations. 
4  The ICCPR, ibid, at art 40(1) determines, for example, that:  
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they 
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of those rights.  
For an overview of the reporting status of New Zealand, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights "New Zealand" (2012) United Nations Human Rights <www.ohchr.org>. Another way in which 
compliance with some treaties is monitored by these treaty bodies [TBs] is through complaints of 
individuals. New Zealand accepted this communications procedure under the ICCPR, CERD, CAT and 
CEDAW. 
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On the basis of the opening quotations, one might expect that this process of State reporting and 
adoption of COs has a considerable influence in New Zealand. This article will seek to unravel 
whether this assumption holds true. More particularly, this article assesses the effectiveness of the 
COs, "effectiveness" being understood as the extent to which policy and/or legislative measures 
have been undertaken as a result of COs. This article will also concentrate on the factors that 
influence the State when implementing recommendations and taking measures on the basis of the 
COs. In terms of methodology, the results presented in this article are primarily based on a 
documentary analysis of parliamentary papers, UN documents and academic literature. In addition, 
around 60 interviews were held with government officials, former ministers, representatives from 
NGOs and the NZHRC, academics, lawyers and judges, in June and July 2012. 
Part I will outline the impact of the process of State reporting and the COs at the domestic level, 
and the attention that has been paid by domestic actors – such as Parliament, NGOs, the media and 
courts – to the COs. Part II touches on the effectiveness of the COs. Part III will discuss several 
political and cultural factors existing in New Zealand that have contributed to the ineffectiveness of 
the majority of COs, and will explain why government officials are – with some exceptions – not 
eager to automatically act upon COs.  
I DOMESTIC IMPACT AND DOMESTIC MOBILISATION 
A Government 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) is responsible for the "overall coordination" 
of the preparation of State reports.5 Up to 2006, MFAT also compiled the reports for the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). MFAT often 
contracted external independent advisors to write the reports.6 The Ministry of Women's Affairs 
(MWA), the Ministry of Youth Affairs (MYA) and the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) 
were responsible for the reports for the Convention of the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCROC) respectively.7 Since 2006, the Bill of Rights and Human Rights Team at the Ministry of 
  
5  Core document forming part of the reports of States parties: New Zealand HRI/CORE/NZL/2010 (2010) at 
[237]. 
6  The 2001 State reports under the ICCPR and ICESCR were written by Petra Butler, Associate Professor at 
Victoria University of Wellington. 
7  Responsibility for the compilation of the UNCROC report shifted to the Ministry of Social Development 
[MSD] during the writing of the combined third and fourth report in 2008. The organisation of the process 
of reporting is briefly described in New Zealand's Common Core Documents: Core document forming part 
of the reports of States parties: New Zealand, above n 5, at [237]; and Core document forming the initial 
part of the reports of States parties: New Zealand HRI/CORE/NZL/2006 (2006) at [132].  
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Justice (MOJ) has become more directly involved in the process of State reporting and has taken 
over MFAT's responsibility for preparing the reports for the ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT and CERD.8  
Coincidentally or not, the organisation of the process of reporting has improved since the MOJ 
has become more involved. This is especially visible in the reduction of delays in the submission of 
reports to TBs. The State reports that were submitted at the beginning of the millennium (between 
January and October 2001) saw significant delays: UNCROC (nine months); CERD (21 months); 
CAT (36 months); ICCPR (72 months); and ICESCR (74 months). The CEDAW report was 
submitted in October 2002 with a delay of "only" eight months. New Zealand subsequently made a 
catch-up effort to get completely up-to-date with its reporting obligations.9 As a result of this, New 
Zealand was able to submit its next reports on time (CAT 2007 and UNCROC 2008) or with 
relatively short delays of a couple of months (CEDAW 2006 and 2010, two and three months 
respectively; ICCPR 2007, five months; CERD 2006 and 2011, five and two months respectively; 
and ICESCR 2009, 10 months). The MOJ has also created a comprehensive website comprising 
information about, and all the documents relating to, the reporting process.10  
Another improvement is the increased participation of government ministers in the process.11 
Since 1994, all Associate Ministers for Women's Affairs have headed dialogue with the CEDAW 
Committee.12 More recently, the delegation to the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in 2010 
(and to the Universal Periodic Review in 2009) was headed by the then Minister of Justice, Mr 
Power.13 Almost all government officials interviewed mentioned Mr Power's close personal interest. 
They noted that the attendance of a minister, and his participation in dialogue, proved the 
importance of the process.  
  
8  Core document forming the initial part of the reports of States parties: New Zealand, ibid. 
9  Summary Record: Fourth periodic report of New Zealand CCPR/C/SR.2015 (2002) at [48]. 
10  Ministry of Justice [MOJ] "Human Rights" <www.justice.govt.nz>. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade [MFAT] has a website as well, but this contains hardly any explanation of the process and the 
documents are also less complete than those on the MOJ website. See MFAT "Human Rights" (24 January 
2012) <www.mfat.govt.nz>. MFAT did, however, produce a handbook containing the texts of and 
information about the treaties: MFAT New Zealand Handbook on International Human Rights (Printlink, 
Wellington, 2008).  
11  NZHRC Human Rights in New Zealand 2010: Ngā Tika Tangata O Aotearoa (December 2010) at 22–23. 
See also NZHRC Tūi Tūi Tuituiā: Race Relations in 2010 (March 2011) at 6. 
12  Hon Katherine O'Regan MP (1994); Deborah Morris MP (1998); Hon Ruth Dyson MP (2003); and Hon 
Lianne Dalziel MP (2007). 
13  The other delegations were headed by the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the UN Office at 
Geneva or the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Youth Affairs [MYA] and MSD in the case of UNCROC 
in 2003 and 2011.  
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There has, to date, not been a formal process for considering COs. In particular, for the 2001 and 
2002 reports, interviewees observed that there was a post-dialogue feeling that New Zealand had got 
away "scot-free". In response to an Official Information Act (OIA) request, the MOJ confirmed that 
"there was no formal consideration of concluding observations between 2003 and 2008" with 
respect to the ICESCR COs 2003.14 This coincides with the problem discussed during the New 
Zealand Diversity Forum 2009 that COs:15 
 … tend to go on the shelf until just before the next reporting round for a treaty and then there is an 
urgent message sent out from MFAT to departments asking what have they done to fulfil or implement 
the recommendations.  
 It seems, however, that the more recent COs have been taken more seriously, even though a 
formal process for responding to COs is still absent and remains largely ad hoc and reactionary. 
Officials provided the Minister of Justice with briefings about the CAT COs 2009 and ICCPR COs 
2010, and explained the extent to which new action was required in response to the COs.16 This has 
also happened for CEDAW COs.17 A more systematic and continuous approach was in place only 
for UNCROC COs 1997 and 2003 in the form of an UNCROC Work Programme.18 The UNCROC 
Work Programme was tabled in Cabinet to obtain the agreement of other ministers and to get it into 
the work programmes of other departments. This was done deliberately because most of the issue 
areas covered in the COs were the responsibility of other departments.  
The COs have only been sporadically referred to by members of Government in Parliament. 
Ministers have almost never stated during parliamentary debates that a certain policy or legislative 
  
14  Letter from Fiona Illingsworth (Acting Manager of Bill of Rights and Human Rights, MOJ) to Peter 
Shuttleworth (Committee Member of Action for Children and Youth in Aotearoa Incorporated [ACYA]) 
regarding the Government's response to and parliamentary scrutiny of COs in the period 2003–2008 (22 
May 2012) (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the MOJ). 
15  Helen P Greatrex "Complementarity: Towards Robust Human Rights Governance in the New Zealand State 
Sector" (PhD Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2010) at 128–129. 
16  Illingsworth, above n 14. 
17  The COs 2007 were, for example, discussed by the Ministry of Women's Affairs [MWA] with senior 
government officials from other departments and the non-governmental organisation [NGO] caucus. The 
Minister of Women's Affairs sent a letter to other ministers in April 2008 to inform them about the CEDAW 
COs 2007 and the necessity of reporting on progress in 2010: Seventh periodic report of New Zealand 
CEDAW/C/NZL/7 (2010) at 75. 
18  At the time of interviewing (June 2012) there was no work programme for the COs 2011. Instead, officials 
were thinking about addressing some COs in a future Children's Action Plan proposed in the Green Paper 
Every child thrives, belongs, achieves (Ministry of Social Development, Green Paper for Vulnerable 
Children, 2012) which deals with vulnerable children (available online at 
<www.childrensactionplan.govt.nz>). 
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action needed to be taken as a result of the criticisms or recommendations of TBs.19 On the 
contrary, ministers have been remarkably dismissive about the recommendations in public. The 
most well-known example is the early warning procedure decision of the CERD in relation to the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (FSA).20 The day after the CERD Committee made its decision, the 
Prime Minister stated that:21  
This is a committee on the outer edges of the UN system. It is not a court. It did not follow any rigorous 
process as we would understand one. In fact, the process itself would not withstand scrutiny at all. 
…  
Well, I think I have a somewhat better understanding of the UN system than they do.  
The Hon Dr Michael Cullen, then Deputy Prime Minister, responded to a question by Keith Locke 
MP (Green Party) about the CAT Committee's 2004 criticism of the security risk certificate 
procedure applied to Ahmed Zaoui, saying that:22 
Mr Zaoui is free to cross over the foreshore and seabed at any time, which is more than one can say for 
some of the countries represented on the United Nations Human Rights Committee at the present stage.  
This aggressively defensive reaction was said to be rather surprising and inconsistent with New 
Zealand's rhetoric on human rights (see Part III B).23 Several interviewees noted that the 
Government's public response to TB findings became more careful, diplomatic and sophisticated in 
tone after 2006. The Government has adopted a "more low-key approach" by giving less publicity to 
negative decisions, probably because it has realised that such a strategy is more effective for 
  
19  Only occasionally was this done. Hon Lianne Dalziel MP (Minister of Women's Affairs) quoted the COs 
2003 and held that the Human Rights (Women in Armed Forces) Amendment Bill 2007 was "doing 
precisely what we were asked to do" by the CEDAW Committee: (4 April 2007) 638 NZPD 8678. Hon Phil 
Goff MP (Minister of Defence) stated something similar: (4 April 2007) 638 NZPD 8684. Hon Christopher 
Finlayson MP (Attorney-General) mentioned that the UN Human Rights Committee [UNHRC] commended 
the Immigration Act 2009, in reaction to references by Keith Locke MP (Green Party) and Rahui Katene 
MP (Māori Party) to the COs 2010: (30 March 2010) 661 NZPD 10104. Likewise, Mr Finlayson referred to 
the decision of the CERD relating to the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 [FSA] in relation to the history 
leading up to the repeal of this Act: (15 March 2011) 670 NZPD 17181. 
20  For a good overview of the decision and the procedure, see Claire Charters and Andrew Erueti "Report 
From the Inside: the CERD Committee's Review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004" (2005) 36 
VUWLR 257. 
21  Interview with the Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister (John Dunne, Breakfast Show TRN 3ZB, 14 March 
2005) transcript cited in Charters and Erueti, ibid, at 258 and 286. 
22  (9 November 2004) 621 NZPD 16708. 
23  Charters and Erueti, above n 20, at 287. 
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silencing opposition, and that "complaining about Geneva's intrusion" only added fuel to the flames 
and further politicised that intrusion.24  
COs – but also HRTs in general – have played almost no role in legislative policy-making, a 
point which was also acknowledged by government officials. Formally speaking, all Cabinet papers 
need to be assessed in light of "international obligations". This requirement was said by those 
interviewed to be primarily a "tick of the box" exercise or afterthought that does not involve any 
true consideration of possible human rights implications. This limited scrutiny was attributed to 
limited expertise, especially in policy departments (other than the Crown Law Office, MOJ and 
MFAT) that are not particularly familiar with international obligations. Government officials and 
ministers also noted that references to HRTs in Cabinet papers and policy documents are rare and 
that HRTs are rarely used as a way of guiding policies.  
The COs and HRTs also play a minor part in the s 7 procedure under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), which requires the Attorney-General to report to Parliament where a 
Bill appears to be inconsistent with the NZBORA. Although the consistency of Bills with HRTs is 
not examined as such, HRTs can be used in the interpretation of the NZBORA. Particularly for 
ICCPR reporting, there is a logical rationale for examining this consistency because of the reference 
to the ICCPR in the Preamble of the NZBORA. A scan of the s 7 reports on the MOJ website shows 
that the ICCPR has indeed been invoked occasionally.25 Of the 58 reports (of which 28 relate to 
government Bills and 30 to private members' Bills), nine referred to the UNHRC and the ICCPR 
and another three discussed only the ICCPR. Two out of these nine references concerned the COs 
for New Zealand.26 Of the other HRTs, CAT and UNCROC were mentioned only once.27 
  
24  Statements were made in relation to Australia, whose officials had initially reacted forcefully to negative 
views of TBs as well. See Hilary Charlesworth and others No Country is an Island: Australia and 
International Law (University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2006) at 88. 
25  MOJ "Section 7 Reports" <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
26  ICCPR COs 1995 were mentioned in relation to the review of sentences in Hon Margaret Wilson Report of 
the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Criminal Justice (Parole 
Offenders) Amendment Bill (Office of the Attorney-General, 2000) at [21]. The General Comments [GCs] 
and the views in individual communications were also both referred to three times. The COs for Belgium 
were referred to once in relation to the Local Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2) 2001 as an example of the 
criticism of the UNHRC on restrictions on the publication of opinion polls. 
27  CAT COs 2009 were quoted once in relation to the impact of the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act 2005 
and the right to an effective remedy. ICCPR COs 2010 were also briefly mentioned. In his Report of the 
Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Prisoners' and Victims' Claims 
(Redirecting Prisoner Compensation) Amendment Bill (Office of the Attorney-General, 13 October 2011) 
Hon Christopher Finlayson MP stated at [20]–[21] that the proposed Bill "could attract further negative 
attention". Both the UNCROC and CRPD were mentioned once in Hon Margaret Wilson Report of the 
Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Care of Children Bill (Office of the 
Attorney-General, 11 June 2003) at [19] and Hon Christopher Finlayson Report of the Attorney-General 
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Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was referred to almost three times as much as the 
UNHRC, while the number of references to the European Court of Human Rights (ECTHR) and 
United Kingdom courts is at least roughly equal.28 One explanation for the smaller impact of the 
ICCPR and the prominence of Canadian jurisprudence is that NZBORA was very much influenced 
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. In contrast, the New Zealand Government 
held that the provisions in the ICCPR do "not raise any additional considerations other than those 
discussed in respect of the BORA rights".29 This perspective is confirmed by Bills vetted by the 
MOJ or sometimes the Crown Law Office that were deemed to be consistent with NZBORA.30 
These results corroborate with a 2001 re-evaluation study that pointed to the focus of the MOJ 
on familiarity with the ICCPR, instead of a broader range of international human rights law.31 The 
  
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Eden Park Trust Amendment Bill (Office of the 
Attorney-General, 8 April 2009) at [25] respectively. 
28  26 references to the Supreme Court of Canada [SCC] were counted, nine to the European Court of Human 
Rights [ECTHR] (two for the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] only) and eight to United 
Kingdom courts, including the House of Lords. Note, however, that there was no systematic database search 
option, which explains the mentioning of "at least". The actual number could be higher. Other courts 
referred to more than once were, amongst others, the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of 
Appeal of Ontario, the Constitutional Court of South Africa and courts in Australia and Hong Kong. 
29  Fourth periodic report of New Zealand (continued) CCPR/C/SR.2016 (2002) at [33]. 
30  The UNHRC was addressed in 32 instances and the ICCPR in 37. The SCC (107 times) and the ECTHR (64 
times) were referred to more often. CEDAW, the ICESCR and their respective Committees have not been 
addressed at all in this vetting process. Both the CERD and CAT Committees were referred to once, while 
the UNCROC Committee was mentioned twice and the UNCROC 12 times. The Report on the Crimes 
(Reasonable Parental Control and Correction) Amendment Bill (Office of Legal Counsel for the Attorney-
General, 2 October 2009) at [9] quoted the UNCROC COs 2003 and referred to the endorsement of these in 
CAT COs 2004. GC 10 of the UNCROC Committee was mentioned in the context of the Report on the 
Children Young Persons and their Families (Youth Courts Jurisdiction & Orders) Amendment Bill (Office 
of Crown Counsel for the Attorney-General, 5 February 2009) at [5]. The early warning procedure decision 
of the CERD in relation to the FSA 2004 was cited in the footnotes to the Report on the Marine and Coastal 
Area (Takutai Moana) Bill (Office of the Acting Attorney-General, 2 September 2010) at n 14. Note that the 
latter was not found with the search terms in the previous footnote. On 18 July 2012, a search was 
performed on MOJ "New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" <www.justice.govt.nz/policy> (with the option 
"only in current section" ticked) with the following terms: "Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights" (zero results); "Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (zero results); "Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (zero results); "Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (zero results); "Convention Against Torture" 
(three results); "Committee Against Torture" (one result); "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination" (one result); "Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination" 
(zero results); "Convention on the Rights of the Child" (12 results); "Committee on the Rights of the Child" 
(two results); "Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (37 results); and "Human Rights Committee" (32 
results). 
31  Peter Cooper and others Re-evaluation of The Human Rights Protections in New Zealand (MOJ, October 
2000) at [230]. 
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study further held that international human rights obligations are generally only taken into account 
in the government policy-making process at a relatively late stage.32 When they are considered at an 
early stage, which seldom happens, the practice is "patchy, uneven and unsystematic" and dependent 
upon a particular government official or minister.33 The process operates primarily in a negative 
way, whereby it is considered whether the Bill does not contravene international obligations. The 
principal objective is to reduce the chance of legal proceedings being brought. In addition, human 
rights issues are only considered rather superficially.34 This is what Claudia Geiringer and Matthew 
Palmer termed a "checklist" approach to human rights protection.35  
B Parliament 
Parliament is not involved in the process of reporting by the government. State reports and COs 
are not sent to or tabled in Parliament.36 The government considers the periodic reports to be 
government reports, which do not require the approval of the House of Representatives.37 Despite 
this, COs have been referred to and discussed in Parliament on a number of occasions. Individual 
Members of Parliament (MPs) have occasionally picked up on and referred to COs, particularly 
when they were already campaigning for a certain issue, such as the repeal of the FSA.  
  
32  Cooper and others, ibid, at [28]. 
33  Cooper and others, above n 31, at [209]. 
34  Cooper and others, above n 31, at [214]. 
35  Claudia Geiringer and Matthew SR Palmer "Human Rights and Social Policy in New Zealand" (2007) 30 
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 12 at 33. 
36  Illingsworth, above n 14. 
37  Sixth periodic report of New Zealand CEDAW/C/SR.805 (B) (2007) at [48].  
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Table 1: Impact of HRTs and COs in Parliament (2000–2012)38 
Number of references in 
Parliament to: 
The HRT or TB The process of State 
reporting 
The COs 
CAT 23 1 9 
CERD 6 - 13 
ICESCR 6 1 - 
UNCROC 72 4 6 
CEDAW 7 6 5 
ICCPR 50 1 2 
Table 1 shows that the highest number of references to COs in Parliament related to the CERD, 
with 13 in total. There were even 18 occasions during which the 2005 early warning procedure 
decision of the CERD Committee in relation to the FSA was referred to.39 Almost all of these 
references were made by MPs from the Māori Party. This is not surprising, since the political party 
was founded in 2004 as a result of the FSA saga. Noteworthy is that the Māori Party was also 
directly involved in the process of State reporting by way of submitting an alternative report to the 
CERD Committee in May 2007.40 In addition to the Māori Party, another political party that has 
  
38  On 14 June 2012, an advanced search was conducted on New Zealand Parliament "Hansard and Journals" 
<www.parliament.nz>, which contains the transcript of debates in the House of Representatives as well as 
written and oral questions from all debates since 1 January 2000. The results were: "Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (four results); "Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" 
(six results); "Committee Against Torture" (51 results); "Convention Against Torture" (107 results); 
"Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (three results); 
"Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (67 results); "Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination" (82 results); "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination" (28 results); "Committee on the Rights of the Child" (21 results); "Convention on 
the Rights of the Child" (273 results); "Human Rights Committee" (69 results); and "International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights" (121 results). Note that the table refers to the number of occasions or debates 
during which the UN HRTs were referred to. This explains why the actual numbers in the table are lower 
than the search results, which count every reference individually.  
39  Six out of these 18 references were made prior to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination Decision on Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1 (2005), and were more 
procedure related. Reference was primarily made by Māori Party MPs, as well as Metiria Turei MP (Green 
Party) three times; Sue Kedgley MP (Green Party) three times; and Russell Fairbrother MP (Labour Party) 
once. During a debate about the FSA, Metiria Turei MP, Nandor Tanczos MP and Keith Locke MP (all 
Green Party) also referred to the complaint to the CERD Committee. 
40  Māori Party Report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Shadow 
Report, May 2007). 
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frequently alluded to COs and HRTs is the Green Party.41 The most prominent example is Sue 
Bradford MP's private members' Bill42 which was announced on 6 October 2003 in response to the 
UNCROC COs 2003 that had been adopted three days earlier. Ms Bradford stated that she was 
"stirred into political action by the recommendations that the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child made on two occasions".43 Reference to HRTs and COs can give small opposition parties in 
particular some authority and an additional lever in the debate. Such parties use them as a political 
tool to portray their party as "rights friendly".44  
What is remarkable is the relatively high number of references to CAT COs. Several factors 
might have contributed to this. First, the parliamentary discussion of the Crimes of Torture 
Amendment Act 2006 in the context of the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture (OPCAT)45 offered an opportunity for MPs to allude to the most recent CAT COs. 
During all three readings of the Crimes of Torture Amendment Act, the CAT COs 2004 were 
addressed by Pita Sharples MP and Te Ururoa Flavell MP (Māori Party) and Mr Locke (Green 
Party).46 Second, following OPCAT's ratification, annual reports of the NZHRC about the 
  
41  In a study conducted by Petra Butler about the references to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
[NZBORA], she pointed to the following quite active MPs – Nandor Tanczos MP, Sue Bradford MP, Keith 
Locke MP (all Green Party) and Hon Wayne Mapp MP (National Party): Petra Butler "It Takes Two to 
Tango – Have They Learned Their Steps?" (2011) <http://papers.ssrn.com> at 45. 
42  Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill 2005 (271-1). 
43  Beth Wood, Ian Hassall and George Hook Unreasonable Force: New Zealand's journey towards banning 
the physical punishment of children (Save the Children New Zealand, Wellington, 2008) at 176 and 204. 
44  Petra Butler "It Takes Two to Tango – Have They Learned Their Steps?" above n 41, at 51; Andrew Geddis 
"Prisoner Voting and Rights Deliberation: How New Zealand's Parliament Failed" [2011] NZ L Rev 443 at 
471. 
45  Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 2375 UNTS 237 (opened for signature 4 February 2003, entered into force 22 June 2006) 
[OPCAT]. 
46  (21 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6685; (6 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6272 and 6274; (28 March 2006) 
630 NZPD 2214 respectively. OPCAT established the Subcommittee Against Torture, which has the 
mandate to visit places of detention. In addition, OPCAT obliged State parties to appoint a national 
preventive mechanism [NPM] to carry out visits to places of detention, to monitor the treatment of and 
conditions for detainees and to make recommendations regarding the prevention of ill treatment. In New 
Zealand the central NPM is the NZHRC. The Office of the Ombudsman is the NPM for prisons, 
immigration detention facilities, and health and disability places of detention. The functions of the NPM for 
child and youth residences are performed by the Ombudsman together with the Office of the Children's 
Commissioner [OCC]. The Independent Police Conduct Authority is the NPM for people in the custody of 
the police. The Inspector of Service Penal Establishments is the NPM for New Zealand Defence Force 
detention facilities. See NZHRC Monitoring Places of Detention: Annual report of activities under the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 (February 
2012).  
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monitoring of places of detention have been tabled in Parliament, providing another chance to 
discuss or refer to the CAT COs (see Part I D). 
Noteworthy is that quite a number of MPs referred to the criticisms or recommendations of the 
TBs with disapproval and criticised the TBs. These negative reactions primarily came from MPs of 
the ACT, NZ First and, to a lesser extent, National Parties. Sometimes Labour MPs were also 
critical of the TBs and their COs or decisions, especially when they related to policy and legislation 
championed by the Labour Government (1999–2008).47 Darren Hughes MP (Labour Party) noted, 
for example, that:48  
… people at the fringes of politics have become very excited about a report from a United Nations 
committee regarding the Foreshore and Seabed Act. But I think it is very important to put on the record 
that that overseas committee considered that important matter for simply 35 minutes, and that it was not 
a committee made up of countries that we could say have a better race relations record than New 
Zealand does. 
John Hayes MP (National Party) stated that the "treaty committee system … is expensive and it 
is not delivering an iota of value to the people whom I represent in the Wairarapa."49 Tony Ryall 
MP (National Party) argued in similar fashion that: "New Zealand has made it quite clear to all the 
international agencies that we will not follow their rules as we have our own rules."50 Future 
Minister of Justice Mr Power (National Party) was also critical about MPs who would like to have 
the recommendations of the UNHRC implemented "lickety-split".51 Stephen Franks MP (ACT 
Party) went even further by stating that:52 
 … this Government now claims, absolutely falsely, that we are obliged by the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee, the members of which are appointed by some of the most disgusting, vile, and cruel 
dictators on this earth. Mr Mugabe has a nominee on the United Nations Human Rights Committee, as 
  
47  See for example some critical, albeit nuanced, remarks of Russell Fairbrother MP (Labour Party) in relation 
to the FSA: (23 November 2005) 628 NZPD 422. More unconditional support for the TBs and their 
criticism comes from the Green Party and the Māori and Mana Parties.  
48  (16 March 2005) 624 NZPD 19241. 
49  (21 November 2006) 630 NZPD 2218. During the first and second reading of the Bill, Mr Hayes expressed 
similar criticism as to the bureaucratic nature of the 10-year negotiation process of OPCAT: (28 March 
2006) 630 NZPD 2218. He also noted that New Zealand has a leadership role in relation to human rights 
and it is already complying with the obligations under OPCAT: (7 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6270. 
50  (12 May 2005) 625 NZPD 20555. 
51  (14 October 2003) 612 NZPD 9158. 
52  (1 June 2005) 626 NZPD 20970 and 21023. On an earlier occasion Mr Franks stated: "The international 
bureaucrats, and the torturers, the robbers, and the tyrants who put people on to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee, have said that New Zealand cannot do it": (12 May 2005) 625 NZPD 20564. 
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does the Sudan – a country that is arresting people who are reporting mass rape – and this Government 
says we kowtow, in this country, to the United Nations Human Rights Committee!  
This quote also illustrates that MPs often confuse the UNHRC with the Human Rights Council, or 
the former Commission.  
These findings coincide with the conclusions of several scholars that Parliament has hardly 
discussed or paid attention to the NZBORA or human rights. The focus of these authors has been on 
the extent to which Parliament has considered s 7 reports or has been willing to adopt a Bill without 
addressing NZBORA inconsistencies. Their research suggests that MPs have rarely used the 
Attorney-General's s 7 reports to question or discuss government Bills in a comprehensive way.53 In 
addition, Parliament continued to adopt legislation, even where the Attorney-General expressed 
doubts about its conformity with NZBORA.54 One could argue that if Parliament easily overlooks 
NZBORA issues, they are even more likely to ignore HRTs or COs altogether. In addition, if 
Parliament can or does ignore s 7 reports and legislates against NZBORA, it is to be expected that 
they feel even less constrained from doing so by HRTs or COs, as the quotations above show.  
Several explanations can be given for the limited parliamentary attention paid to HRTs in 
general and COs in particular. First of all, interviewees noted that MPs' awareness and knowledge of 
  
53  Janet McLean noted that the enactment of NZBORA has not attracted more anxious scrutiny of Bills and in 
many respects the moral tone of the debates has declined: Janet McLean "The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 and Constitutional Propriety" (unpublished paper, 2011) (forthcoming). Janet Hiebert also referred 
to the "misplaced confidence" that parliamentary Bills of Rights increase the ability of parliaments to 
scrutinise legislation: Janet L Hiebert "Governing Like Judges?" in Tom Campbell, KD Ewing and Adam 
Tomkins (eds) The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011) 40 at 60. James Kelly even stated that political rights reviews and Parliament itself "has been reduced 
to theatre – a prepared script performed by actors with clear outcomes and directions from the front 
benches." NZBORA has, in his view, functioned as an "under-insured" Bill of Rights. See James B Kelly 
"Judicial and Political Review as Limited Insurance: the Functioning of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
in 'Hard' Cases" (2011) 49 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 295 at 308. See also Tessa Bromwich 
"Parliamentary rights-vetting under the NZBORA" [2009] NZLJ 189; Janet L Hiebert "Rights-vetting in 
New Zealand and Canada: Similar Idea, Different Outcomes" (2005) 3 NZJPIL 36 at 88; and Geddis 
"Prisoner Voting and Rights Deliberation: How New Zealand's Parliament Failed", above n 44. For slightly 
more positive views, see Paul Rishworth "The Bill of Rights and Rights Dialogue in New Zealand: After 20 
years, What Counts as Success?" (Paper presented to University of Sydney Workshop on Judicial 
Supremacy or Inter-Institutional Dialogue: Political Responses to Judicial Review, Sydney Law School, 
Sydney, May 2010) as cited in McLean "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Constitutional 
Propriety" (unpublished paper, 2011) at 21 (forthcoming); and Petra Butler "It Takes Two to Tango – Have 
They Learned Their Steps?", above n 41, at 51. 
54  Kelly, ibid, at 308–309. Paul Rishworth held that a s 7 report in relation to these law and order issues has 
become a "badge of honour": Rishworth as cited in McLean, ibid, at 22. See also Claire Charters 
"Responding to Waldron's Defence of Legislatures: Why New Zealand's Parliament Does Not Protect 
Rights in Hard Cases" [2006] NZ L Rev 621; Andrew Geddis "The Comparative Irrelevance of the 
NZBORA to Legislative Practice" (2009) 23 NZULR 465 at 477–479. 
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UN processes is fairly limited and, thus, depends very much upon individual MPs' knowledge. 
Second, because there is no freestanding Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights as there is in 
the United Kingdom, there is no inbuilt interest in and commitment to international human rights 
obligations. Third, it is difficult for MPs to use COs or HRTs or to put something on the agenda 
when it is not reported on in the media (see Part I F). Fourth, and most important, is the absence of 
information coming from the Government. One interviewed MP stated that if NGOs had not been 
involved in the process or been to Geneva, no information would get through to New Zealand. 
Reference to COs or HRTs was often the result of work by NGOs or interested individuals and 
lawyers who alerted MPs to the COs. A recent example of this occurring is Jan Logie MP's (Green 
Party) media release in which she highlighted the ICESCR Committee's criticism of welfare 
reforms.55 This was brought to her attention by the NGO Peace Movement Aotearoa (PMA).56 
Likewise, Tariana Turia MP (Māori Party) referred to the fact that barrister Tony Ellis drew 
attention to the CAT COs 2004 in relation to compensation of prisoners.57 During the same debate, 
David Clendon MP (Green Party) referred to a Law Society report that also addressed the COs.58 As 
Part I E shows, NGO advocacy has, however, not been structured enough to keep Parliament fully 
up-to-date.  
C National Courts and Legal Practice 
Although international human rights law has increasingly been used59 and relied on by courts in 
various ways,60 COs have hardly had any impact, if at all. The only case known to the author is that 
  
55  Green Party "UN advises Govt it's not too late to cancel welfare reforms" (press release, 22 May 2012). See 
also, for example, Radio New Zealand "The United Nations has criticised New Zealand's proposed welfare 
reforms for breaching human rights" Radio New Zealand News (22 May 2012) <www.radionz.co.nz> .  
56  Email from Jan Logie (Green Party MP) to the author replying to a question from the author regarding how 
the criticism had come to her attention (14 June 2012).  
57  (22 June 2010) 664 NZPD 12065.  
58  (22 June 2010) 664 NZPD 12087. 
59  John W Hopkins talked about "a modified monism … [of a] judge-made nature": John W Hopkins "New 
Zealand" in Dinah Shelton (ed) International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, 
Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 429 at 446–447. Claudia 
Geiringer also pointed to the move from distrust to considerable receptivity to international law, which she 
labelled as a quiet revolution: Claudia Geiringer "International Law through the Lens of Zaoui: Where is 
New Zealand At?" (2006) 17 Public Law Review 300 at 300 and 309. 
60  This Part will not discuss the ways in which courts have used international law as a rhetorical device or 
justification for the court's own interpretation or with the two models of mandatory considerations for the 
executive and the presumption of consistency. For a good overview, see Hopkins in Shelton, ibid; Geiringer 
"International Law through the Lens of Zaoui: Where is New Zealand At?", ibid; Claudia Geiringer "Tavita 
and All That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated Treaties and Administrative Law" 
(2004) 21 NZULR 66; and Claudia Geiringer "The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A 
Critical Examination of R v Hansen" (2008) 6 NZPJIL 59. For an earlier study about the ways in which 
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of the CAT Committee COs 2004 that were invoked before the Supreme Court by barrister Tony 
Ellis in Taunoa v Attorney-General, albeit with no result.61  
A study undertaken by Mark Gobbi found that the two HRTs that have been addressed most 
often by the courts between 20 December 1999 and 30 June 2010 were UNCROC62 and the ICCPR, 
163 and 164 times respectively.63 Only sporadically do courts refer to other HRTs.64 Other studies 
have looked at the number of times TB output has been cited in particular. A study conducted by 
James Allan, Grant Huscroft and Nessa Lynch in 2007 found 17 cases in which the UNHRC was 
cited. Interestingly, this study found that the ECTHR judgments, as well as those of Canadian and 
American jurisdictions, have been cited more often than the UNHRC.65 The UNCROC and 
ICESCR Committees were both cited once. Earlier, in 1999, Butler and Butler concluded that the 
number of references to the UNHRC is still minimal.66 In 1999, there were only five cases in which 
the views of the UNHRC were referred to.67 The authors also noted that the number of references to 
  
courts can deal with unincorporated treaties, see Law Commission A New Zealand Guide to International 
Law and its Sources (NZLC R34, 1996). 
61  Note that Elias CJ referred to the CAT Committee as the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, mixing it 
up with the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment CETS 126 (opened for signature 26 November 1987, entered into force 1 February 1989). The 
Chief Justice referred to the recommendation to conduct an inquiry leading to the decision of the High Court 
in Taunoa v Attorney-General. However, the Supreme Court, and especially the Chief Justice, discussed 
extensively GC 20 and the views of the UNHRC in individual communications as well as the ICCPR State 
report 2001: see Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429 at [31], [59], [77]–[78], 
[80]–[82], [84]–[85], [91], [93], [102] and [104] per Elias CJ; [163]–[169], [187] and [228] per Blanchard J; 
and [355] and [360] per McGrath J.   
62  One explanation for the prominent role of UNCROC in legal practice is the Tavita case of 1994, which 
rather extensively discussed UNCROC as well as the ICCPR and the case law of the ECTHR. The Court of 
Appeal held UNCROC to be a mandatory consideration for State officials when they exercise discretion in 
matters affecting children: Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA).  
63  Mark Gobbi "Treaty Action and Implementation" (2004) 1 NZYIL 223; (2005) 2 NZYIL 357; (2006) 3 
NZYIL 221; (2007) 4 NZYIL 311; (2007–2008) 5 NZYIL 279; (2008) 6 NZYIL 379; (2010) 7 NZYIL 381. 
64  CAT (nine times); ICESCR (eight times); CEDAW (once); and CERD (zero times). Up to 2004, there were 
only five claims made under art 3 of CAT: Third periodic report of New Zealand (continued) 
CAT/C/SR.607 (2004) at [3]. 
65  James Allan, Grant Huscroft and Nessa Lynch "The Citation of Overseas Authority in Rights Litigation in 
New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?" (2007) 11 Otago L Rev 433 at 438. 
66  Andrew Butler and Petra Butler "The Judicial Use of International Human Rights Law in New Zealand" 
(1999) 29 VUWLR 173 at 184, ns 51–52; Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2005) at [4.5.2].  
67  Two of these also mentioned the GCs of the UNHRC. These five cases are: R v Goodwin (No 2) [1993] 2 
NZLR 390 (CA); Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] NZLR 667 (CA); Martin v District Court at 
Tauranga [1995] 1 NZLR 491 (HC) [Martin]; R v B (1994) 12 CRNZ 681 (HC); Quilter v Attorney-General 
[1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) [Quilter]. Martin and Quilter also mentioned the UNHRC's GCs. The 2009 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence was four times higher than the 
UNHRC.68  
The impact of the ICCPR and the views of the UNHRC are rather minor in light of the total 
number of cases in which NZBORA rights or human rights are potentially at stake. According to the 
Government, there were over 2,500 decisions that referred to NZBORA between 2000 and 2009, 
while there were 156 judgments of the superior courts that mentioned the ICCPR.69 Butler and 
Butler counted 35 judgments in 2005 referring to the ICCPR out of a total of more than 200 
judgments reported, and noted that the ICCPR's impact has been primarily rhetorical instead of 
interpretive.70 Andrew Geddis argued that the absence of a binding enforcement mechanism under 
the ICCPR weakens courts' leeway to engage in an all too bold teleological interpretation.71 As was 
stated above, the ECTHR has been cited more often.72 In Butler and Butlers' view, the reason for 
this is unfamiliarity with and limited access to the work and output of the UNHRC.73 James Allan, 
  
Government replies to the Letter of Intent mentioned another five cases in which GCs and views of the 
UNHRC were referred to: Taunoa v Attorney-General, above n 61; Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 
NZLR 1; Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA); Attorney-General v Zaoui [2005] NZSC 38, [2006] 1 
NZLR 289; and Mist v R [2005] NZSC 77, [2006] 3 NZLR 145. See Replies to the List of Issues to be Taken 
Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Fifth Periodic Report of New Zealand 
CCPR/C/NZL/Q/5/Add.1 (2010) at 11. In the recent case of Atkinson, the Court of Appeal noted that the 
approach of the respondents and NZHRC as intervener was consistent with the approach of the UNHRC in 
GC 18. It also reproduced art 26 of the ICCPR, art 2(2) of the ICESCR and art 23(5) of the CRPD: Ministry 
of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456 at [133] and [134] per Ellen France J. 
68  Butler and Butler "The Judicial Use of International Human Rights Law in New Zealand", above n 66, at 
184. Allan and others noted that the number of references to the ECTHR is three times higher than the 
UNHRC: Allan, Huscroft and Lynch, above n 65, at 438. 
69  Replies to the List of Issues to be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Fifth Periodic 
Report of New Zealand, above n 67.  
70  Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, above n 66, at [4.5.2] and [35.10.3]. 
Petra Butler referred to this approach as a "rhetorical device" to put the judgment in an international context 
as a justification: Petra Butler "The Use of Foreign Jurisprudence in New Zealand Courts" in Andrea 
Büchler and Markus Müller-Chen (eds) Private Law: national – global – comparative (Intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2011) 305 at 320. 
71  It is also implausible that New Zealand's courts feel obliged to go beyond a strictly textualist interpretative 
approach as a result of the non-binding nature of COs. Andrew Geddis contrasted this with the United 
Kingdom, where such an interpretative approach of courts can be grounded in the legally binding judgments 
of the ECTHR. Andrew Geddis "Which Is To Be The Master? Rights-friendly Statutory Interpretation in 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom" (2008) 25 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 733 at 764–765.  
72  It was even expected that the number of references to ECTHR would further increase given the growing 
reliance of New Zealand courts on United Kingdom courts deciding cases under the Human Rights Act 
1998 (which incorporates the ECHR): Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A 
Commentary, above n 66, at [3.6.48]. 
73  Butler and Butler "The Judicial Use of International Human Rights Law in New Zealand", above n 66, at 
184. 
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Grant Huscroft and Nessa Lynch argued that the UNHRC's lower number of citations is not 
surprising because, in the authors' view, it is common knowledge that the quality of decisions of the 
UNHRC is defective. This is because the UNHRC frequently merely enumerate facts and 
submissions while proclaiming the UNHRC's conclusion in a superficial way.74 Interviewees argued 
that the extent to which courts deal with HRTs and/or TB output depends on the degree to which 
they are invoked by lawyers. Lawyers are, however, reluctant to base their arguments on these 
sources when they are uncertain about not only the willingness of courts to take these considerations 
on board, but even about judges' knowledge of those considerations.75  
D The NZHRC 
It is important to consider another domestic actor – the NZHRC – which was established in 
1977 as an independent Crown entity. It advocates and promotes respect for human rights in New 
Zealand. Since the turn of the millennium, the NZHRC has become more active in relation to human 
rights in New Zealand as a result of the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001.76 That Act introduced 
a statutory duty to develop a national action plan for the promotion and protection of human rights 
in New Zealand.77 In September 2004 the NZHRC published the report Human Rights in New 
Zealand Today (2004 report)78 after extensive nationwide consultation, public opinion research and 
submissions, and the contributions of over 5,000 individuals, groups and organisations. In March 
2005, the NZHRC released its Action Plan for Human Rights (2005 NZHRAP), containing 178 
priorities for action.79 This action plan was not formally adopted by the Government. In 2011, the 
  
74  Allan, Huscroft and Lynch, above n 65, at 438–439; David Erdos "Aversive Constitutionalism in the 
Westminster World: The Genesis of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990)" (2007) 5 ICON 343 at 
367–368; Matthew SR Palmer "New Zealand Constitutional Culture" (2007) 22 NZULR 565 at 580 and 
582. 
75  The impression of Butler and Butler was that even within the legal community, knowledge about the ICCPR 
is "limited": Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, above n 66, at [4.5.2] 
and [35.10.3]. Illustrative of this is that there are also few lawyers (only Tony Ellis and John Steven Petris) 
who have brought more than one case before the UNHRC under the individual communications procedure. 
Since ratification of the Optional Protocol under the ICCPR on 26 May 1989, only 20 individual 
communications from New Zealand have been considered by the UNHRC.  
76  The re-evaluation study expressed concern about the almost exclusive focus of the NZHRC on 
discrimination instead of the wider ambit of NZBORA rights and human rights: Cooper and others, above n 
31, at [8] and [9]. 
77  Section 5(2)(m).  
78  NZHRC Human Rights in New Zealand Today: Ngā Tika Tangata O Te Motu, above n 2. 
79  NZHRC The New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights: Mana ki te Tangata – Priorities for Action (31 
March 2005). 
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NZHRC published an updated version of the 2004 report in which progress against the 178 
priorities was measured (2010 report).80 The report formulated 30 further action points.  
The NZHRC has become more involved in the reporting process and has started to integrate 
COs into its work.81 Since 2007 the NZHRC has submitted alternative information to various TBs, 
and representatives of the NZHRC have been present during dialogues with committees.82 The 
Government has also consulted the NZHRC to discuss draft versions of periodic State reports.83 
Further, the NZHRC has increasingly referred to HRTs and COs in its submissions to Parliament. 
An illustration is the 2010 report, which includes significantly more references to COs and HRTs 
than the 2004 report and 2005 NZHRAP. While the latter two documents only referred to the 
CERD, ICCPR, ICESCR and CAT in rather general terms, the 2010 report discussed several other 
COs. Noteworthy is that the 2004 report and the 2005 NZHRAP did mention the CO of the 
UNCROC Committee in relation to corporal punishment in the introduction. In addition, the 2004 
report discussed several of the COs of the UNCROC Committee and the comments in the shadow 
report of Action for Children and Youth in Aotearoa Incorporated (ACYA) more substantively in a 
specific chapter on children's rights.84 One explanation for this heightened attention to the 
UNCROC and COs is that the NZHRC cooperated with the Office of the Children's Commissioner 
(OCC) in the context of the action plan.85  
  
80  NZHRC Human Rights in New Zealand 2010: Ngā Tika Tangata O Aotearoa, above n 11. 
81  NZHRC Human Rights in New Zealand 2010: Ngā Tika Tangata O Aotearoa, above n 11, at 22–23; and 
NZHRC Tūi Tūi Tuituiā: Race Relations in 2010, above n 11, at 6. 
82  A shadow report was submitted for CERD 2007, CAT 2009, ICCPR 2010, ICESCR 2012 and CEDAW 
2012. Race Relations Commissioner [RRC] Joris de Bres was present during CERD 2007. The former Chief 
Human Rights Commissioner, Rosslyn Noonan, attended CAT 2009, UPR 2009 and UNCROC 2011. Equal 
Employment Commissioner Judy McGregor attended ICCPR 2010 (together with Sylvia Bell, NZHCR 
Principal Legal and Policy Analyst) and CEDAW 2012. The Chief Human Rights Commissioner, David 
Rutherford, and one senior staff member, Kendra Beri, attended the dialogue with the ICESCR Committee 
in 2012. 
83  Officials from the MOJ met with representatives of the NZHRC to discuss the draft of the fifth periodic 
report under ICCPR: Replies to the List of Issues to be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of 
the Fifth Periodic Report of New Zealand, above n 67, at [154]. In addition, the NZHRC contributed to the 
sixth CEDAW report of 2006: Sixth Periodic Report of New Zealand (continued) CEDAW/C/SR.806 (B) 
(2007) at [2]. 
84  The individual chapters of the 2004 report are accessible via NZHRC "Human Rights in New Zealand 
Today: Ngā Tika Tangata O Te Motu" (September 2004) <www.hrc.co.nz/report>. Chapter 4 deals with 
children's rights. 
85  Interestingly, the only UN HRT that was explicitly mentioned in the 30 Action Points of the 2010 NZHRC 
report was UNCROC. Action Point 21 mentioned that legislation should reflect the obligations under 
UNCROC in relation to several legislative issues. 
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In addition to the OCC, another Commissioner who deserves specific mention is the Race 
Relations Commissioner (RRC) who has started to monitor the implementation of the COs 2007 in 
the RRC's annual race relations report.86 Special mention should also been made of the role of the 
NZHRC under OPCAT and its function as a body for monitoring places of detention. Since 2007, 
the NZHRC has operated as the central preventative mechanism and coordinates and liaises with the 
other national preventative mechanisms (NPMs).87 An annual report is published about places of 
detention. It was acknowledged by interviewees that although NPMs have not yet developed into a 
mechanism that regularly monitors follow-ups to COs, the COs are nonetheless discussed during the 
regular roundtable meetings, which take place four-to-six times per year. 
E NGOs 
As stated in the introduction, the most important role for NGOs in the process of reporting is the 
submission of shadow reports to the TBs, in which NGOs criticise or alternatively complement the 
usually positive image sketched in the Government report. The involvement of NGOs has increased 
since the mid-2000s. Several new NGOs have become involved since 2000, while other NGOs have 
strengthened their participation in the process. Examples are the establishment of the the Aotearoa 
Indigenous Rights Charitable Trust in 2000 and the Human Rights Foundation Aotearoa (HRFA) in 
2001. The latter was founded because it was felt that there was not really an existing NGO with a 
general human rights perspective. In addition, the New Zealand section of Amnesty International, 
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children created a domestic advocacy 
function five-to-10 years ago, bolstered their domestic advocacy work, and strengthened their 
involvement in the process of State reporting. An illustration of the enhanced participation is that no 
shadow reports were submitted to the UNHRC in 2002 and that for the ICESCR 2003, only a HRFA 
report about housing in New Zealand was submitted.88 By contrast, four and six shadow reports by 
New Zealand-based NGOs were submitted for ICCPR 201089 and ICESCR 2012.90 Likewise, the 
  
86  The reports of 2010 and 2011 assessed the level of implementation by and the response of the Government 
to all the COs 2007 in a table. The RRC has received assistance from the MOJ which helps in gathering an 
update of developments in relation to the COs from various departments each year. See Twentieth periodic 
reports of States Parties due in 2012: New Zealand CERD/C/NZL/20 (2012) at [14]. 
87  See above n 46 for further information about NPMs. 
88  Human Rights Foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand [HRFA] "Housing in New Zealand: Joint NGO 
submission in response to the New Zealand Government's Second Periodic Report to the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (April 2003) <www.humanrights.co.nz>. 
89  Shadow reports were submitted by the following New Zealand-based NGOs or individuals: ACYA; Andrew 
Butler (as convener of the Human Rights Committee of the New Zealand Law Society); Peace Movement 
Aotearoa [PMA]; Barrister of the High Court Tony Ellis; Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust [AIR Trust]; 
and HRFA. 
90  Shadow reports were submitted by the following New Zealand-based NGOs: AIR Trust; Amnesty 
International New Zealand; PMA; and HRFA. 
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involvement of NGOs in relation to the CERD in terms of the submission of shadow reports has 
grown considerably since the – from an NGO point of view, successful – early warning procedure in 
relation to the FSA.91 Several human rights lawyers have also become more active in recent times 
and have submitted shadow reports in relation to ICCPR 2010 and CAT 2009.92 
NGOs can have a crucial role at the domestic level after the COs have been published. This 
domestic involvement of NGOs by way of consultation by the Government or lobbying for the 
implementation of COs has, however, been limited. Involvement of NGOs by the Government has 
not gone further than the circulation of a draft version of the State report for public comment. The 
Government admitted that the involvement of and regular consultation with civil society in the 
process of State reporting and follow-up to the COs could be improved.93 NGOs emphasised that 
they should be better informed at all phases of the reporting process and argued that their 
involvement in the follow-up phase is especially limited.94 Some COs have occasionally been 
referred to in submissions to parliamentary select committees or in media releases. 
The picture is different for UNCROC and to a lesser extent CEDAW. For UNCROC there is a 
coalition of more than 100 NGOs, individuals and families interested in children's rights (ACYA), 
whose objectives are all explicitly centred around UNCROC and the COs of the UNCROC 
Committee.95 For UNCROC and CEDAW there were also consultation meetings between 
government officials and NGOs prior to the submission of the report or the dialogue as well as 
follow-up meetings on the basis of the COs. After the COs 2003, an UNCROC advisory group was 
set up which consisted of members of the OCC, NZHRC and representatives from NGOs (UNICEF, 
  
91  No shadow report for CERD 2002 could be found. The report of the RRC in 2010 pointed to the greater 
involvement of civil society and increased input in the reporting process: NZHRC Tūi Tūi Tuituiā: Race 
Relations in 2010, above n 11, at 6. Besides the NGOs with a general human rights focus (PMA and HRFA) 
as well as children's rights (ACYA), the following Māori organisations submitted a shadow report to the 
CERD Committee in 2007: AIR Trust (made up of Māori individuals with close associations with their iwi); 
and the Treaty Tribes Coalition [TTC] Iwi (representing 15–20 per cent of the Māori population and a 
collective of four iwi Māori or indigenous peoples' authorities in Te Tai Tokerau).  
92  Shadow reports were submitted by Tony Ellis and Antony Shaw, Barristers of the High Court, and lawyer 
Sonja Cooper. ACYA and HRFA also wrote a report. 
93  Replies to the List of Issues to be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Fifth Periodic 
Report of New Zealand, above n 67, at [155]. 
94  See, for example, the 2007 CERD shadow report of the TTC, which stated that the Government had not 
sought engagement with Māori organisations as a follow-up to the COs 2002: TTC NGO 'Alternative 
Report' to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Submission in response to the 
consolidated fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth periodic report of New Zealand (August 2007) at [5]. 
95  ACYA was the Action for Children in Aotearoa [ACA] until 2001. ACYA's objectives are: first, promoting 
the understanding and implementation of UNCROC; second, encouraging action on the basis of the COs of 
the UNCROC Committee; and third, submitting shadow reports to the UNCROC Committee. See ACYA 
"ACYA Aims and Objectives" (2005) <www.acya.org.nz>. 
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Save the Children and ACYA) and which was coordinated by the Ministry of Youth Development 
(MYD). This group met at least twice a year between January 2004 and 2008.96  
F Media Coverage 
Almost all interviewees noted the lack of media coverage with respect to the process of State 
reporting. A quick scan of New Zealand newspapers shows that newspapers have primarily given 
attention to UNCROC, ICCPR and CAT and the COs of those respective Committees.97 In addition, 
there was also significant media coverage of the high profile cases of the repeal of s 59 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 and the FSA.98  
II ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COs 
This Part examines the effectiveness of the COs. The starting point for this was an analysis of 
documents in which a reaction to the COs was provided, in particular the periodic State reports,99 
  
96  The advisory group provided, advised on and assisted in UNCROC-related initiatives, such as the mid-2006 
Forum, and it was offered the opportunity to provide feedback during the preparation of the State report: 
Third and fourth periodic reports submitted by States parties due in 2008: New Zealand CRC/C/NZL/3-4 
(2010) at [13]. 
97  A search was performed of NZ newspapers using Newztext on The Knowledge Basket "Research Archives" 
<www.knowledge-basket.co.nz>. This digital archive contains major daily metropolitan and provincial 
newspapers, including the Dominion Post and the NZ Herald. The search was performed for the period from 
1 September 1995 until 7 June 2012 with the following search terms: "Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights" (nine results); "Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (23 results); 
"Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (two results); "Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women" (46 results); "Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination" (zero results); "Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination" (25 results); "Committee Against Torture" (43 results); "Convention 
Against Torture" (53 results); "Committee on the Rights of the Child" (66 results); "Convention on the 
Rights of the Child" (373 results); "Human Rights Committee" (273 results); and "International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights" (106 results).  
98  "United Nations" and "Foreshore and Seabed" (244 results); "United Nations" and "Smacking" (288 
results); and "United Nations" and "Section 59" (122 results). 
99  CAT COs 2004 were reproduced and responded to in a separate section: Fifth periodic reports of States 
parties: New Zealand CAT/C/NZL/5 (2004) at [293]–[346]. The short reaction to the CAT COs 1998 was 
also included in a separate section: Third periodic reports of States parties due in 1999 (Addendum): New 
Zealand CAT/C/49/Add.3 (2002) at [38]–[39]. The 2002 report to CEDAW started with a part in which the 
COs 1998 were replicated and responded to: Fifth periodic report of States parties: New Zealand 
CEDAW/C/NZL/5 (2002) at 14–24. A response to CEDAW COs 2003 and COs 2007 was given in a table 
appended to the subsequent reports: Sixth periodic report of States parties: New Zealand CEDAW/C/NZL/6 
(2006) at Appendix I, and Seventh periodic report of New Zealand CEDAW/C/NZL/7 (2012). A short 
outline of the Government response to CERD COs 1995 and 2002 of less than one or two pages respectively 
was given in the introduction of the next reports. Some of the COs were also addressed in the body of these 
reports: Fourteenth periodic report of States parties due in 1999 (Addendum): New Zealand 
CERD/C/362/Add.10 (2001) at [3]; Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of 
the Convention: Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: 
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annual progress reports of the UNCROC Work Programme,100 the internal MWA and MOJ 
briefings about CEDAW 2007, CAT 2009 and ICCPR 2010, as well as reports from the NZHRC 
and NGOs. This document analysis was complemented with interviews. Interviewees were first of 
all asked to give examples of effective COs themselves (see Table 2 below). Second, the author 
questioned the interviewees about policy and legislative changes or measures that in his view could 
have been potentially partly influenced or caused by COs.  
Generally speaking, measures are not taken as a result of COs. This is, first of all, because the 
concerns and recommendations of the TBs often coincide with existing policy and legislative 
measures. The internal official MOJ briefing documents with responses to the COs of CAT 2009 
and ICCPR 2010 provided that, except for two COs,101 none "require new work initiatives" and 
many can be implemented as "business as usual: that is, they can be successfully addressed as part 
of the Government's existing work programme".102 For a lot of these rather broadly formulated COs 
work was "already underway"103 for which the Government "is continually developing 
  
New Zealand CERD/C/NZL/17 (2007) at [3]. Some of the CERD COs 2007 are referred to in a footnote. 
The following COs are, however, not explicitly addressed in the CERD report 2012: 11, 22, 24, and 27–39. 
Note that a separate reply was given to the COs in [14], [19], [20] and [23] of Twentieth periodic reports of 
States Parties due in 2012: New Zealand, above n 86. Something similar was done in relation to the 
ICESCR COs 1993: Second periodic reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant: New Zealand E/1990/6/Add.33 (2001) at [48]. The ICESCR report 2009 only referred to three of 
the COs 2003: Third periodic reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: 
New Zealand E/C.12/NZL/3 (2011) at [18]–[27], [167] and [360]. A summary of the reaction to seven of the 
ICCPR COs 1995 was provided in pt 2 of the 2001 report while a more substantive reaction to those COs 
and some others was provided in the main body: Fourth periodic report of States parties due in 1995: New 
Zealand CCPR/C/NZL/2001/4 (2001) at [53]. Only five of the ICCPR COs 2002 were mentioned in the 
main body of the report: Fifth periodic reports of States parties: New Zealand, above n 2.  
100  This programme and subsequent annual progress reports to Cabinet are available on the Ministry of Social 
Development website <www.msd.govt.nz>. 
101  The only CO that "would require active steps if they are to be addressed in full" had to do with the 
withdrawal of reservations to the ICCPR. One interviewed government official, however, held that the 
review would have been completed in the next five years anyway. Officials proposed that it be conducted by 
MOJ and MFAT in order to be completed before 31 March 2012. Nonetheless, this review has been 
deferred: Illingsworth, above n 14. The other CO was the extension of the mandate of the NZHRC to 
receive complaints of human rights violations in the context of immigration. MOJ officials recommended 
that the Minister of Justice not revise the issue at that time, because the Immigration Act 2009 (preventing 
the NZHRC from doing so) had been only recently implemented: "Response to Concluding Observations of 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee" (11 March 2011) HUM-06-02-03 at [6], [14] and [16] 
(Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the MOJ). 
102  The briefing, for example, outlined steps taken before CAT 2009 to ensure that sufficient capacity was 
developed for prisons which "should go some way to addressing" CAT COs 2009: "Responses to 
Recommendations Arising from the Convention Against Torture Presentation" (26 August 2009) HUM-06-
14-02 at [3], [9], [21] and [71] (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the MOJ).  
103  The first UNCROC Work Programme divided the COs into two types: issues in relation to which work was 
"already underway" and issues that called for "new work". The programme aimed to minimise the number 
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strategies".104 Officials argued that the concerns of TBs, which frequently flow out of self-critical 
comments of the Government, were already known and were hence being addressed by the 
Government.105  
Second, other COs were dismissed or not acted upon because they were "likely to be difficult to 
respond [to]" or because "the intervention proposed by the Committee is not preferred by New 
Zealand".106 These COs are found to be politically unacceptable or not feasible budget-wise. 
Examples are the use of tasers, the privatisation of prisons, the entrenchment of the NZBORA and 
the status of the Treaty of Waitangi. In these cases, domestic policy considerations take precedence. 
The Government consequently decides not to take further action at that point in light of "a lateral 
approach [that] may be taken to respond" to the COs.107 Usually the response to the COs in this 
context implies that TBs had made an incorrect appraisal and that a small number of COs "arose 
because of a misunderstanding of the legal frameworks" (see Part IV).108  
A third category includes COs that have been effective. Tables 2 and 3 show an overview of the 
COs that have played a role in New Zealand's political policy and law-making processes. In some 
instances COs were a necessary cause of policy and law-making, although they were often still not 
sufficient in themselves (see Table 2). Usually a "rich combination of influences" is still needed to 
  
of issues in the latter category by developing responses to the COs "as part of existing work wherever 
possible": Second periodic reports of States parties due in 2000: New Zealand CRC/C/93/Add.4 (2003) at 
[20]–[22]. 
104  These strategies are "ongoing" and "long term". They include reducing social inequalities in wellbeing, 
giving assistance to refugee children, and reducing child abuse and health and education disparities. The 
milestones in relation to these items in the UNCROC Work Programme are "to report to the Government on 
a regular basis", the "provision of updated information", "ongoing work" or "further progress" (items 9–11, 
13, 16–17, and 19). Note that this research does not address the COs in relation to the OPCAT under 
UNCROC, which are addressed in items 21–27. 
105  The response to CAT COs 2009 stated that: "none of the matters raised are a surprise": "Responses to 
Recommendations Arising from the Convention Against Torture Presentation", above n 102, at [5].  
106  "Overview of the recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women" (31 March 2008) PIN-02-2007 at [14]–[16] (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 
Request to the MOJ (transferred to the MWA)). 
107  Ibid. 
108  The briefing stated that the CAT Committee's concerns about the discretion of the police to prosecute acts of 
torture were "misplaced". Likewise, a legislative amendment to exclude the admissibility of evidence 
obtained by torture was not necessary because this was already guaranteed by the Evidence Act 2006: 
"Responses to Recommendations Arising from the Convention Against Torture Presentation", above n 102, 
at [3], [50] and [62]. 
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bring about a change, as was, for example, the case with the repeal of s 59 of the Crimes Act 
1961.109  
Table 2: Overview of COs That Were a Conditio Sine Qua Non  
Policy or legislative measure CO Number of 
interviewees who 
mentioned the CO as 
effective 
 Repeal of section 59 [private members' Bill] 
 Education of unlawfully present children 
(reservation art 2 UNCROC)  
 Measures to address inconsistencies in age limits 
 Public education campaign on s 59   
UNCROC 97/ 03  
UNCROC 97/03 
 
UNCROC 97  
UNCROC 97/03  
16 
5 
 
3 
- 
 Strengthening independence of Police Conduct 
Authority 
CAT 09 2 
 Translation CEDAW in Māori CEDAW 98 - 
In other cases, COs have not been an essential condition, but were, nonetheless, an important 
factor in the policy or legislative measures (see Table 3). Government officials noted that some COs 
have raised awareness of or put an issue higher on the agenda, such as the issue of child poverty and 
the over-representation of Māori in prison. In addition, COs have also assisted one side in the debate 
by supporting or strengthening policy arguments. In the case of the FSA repeal, there was, for 
instance, already domestic opposition prior to the 2005 early warning decision of the CERD, but the 
decision, and the COs 2007, became a factor in and galvanised the domestic debate.  
Table 3: Overview of COs as an Important Contributory Cause 
Policy or legislative measure CO Number of 
interviewees who 
mentioned the CO as 
effective 
 Measures to avoid age mixing in prison 
(reservation art 37(c) UNCROC) 
UNCROC 97/03  8 
  
109  Sue Bradford MP, who introduced the private members' Bill, explained that she was "stirred into political 
action by the recommendations that the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child made on two occasions": 
Wood, Hassall and Hook, above n 43, at 204. See also 33, 176, and 201. 
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 Child poverty/ Green Paper for vulnerable 
children 
UNCROC 11 5 
 Strengthening employment position of children 
(reservation art 32 UNCROC) 
UNCROC 97 4 
 Collection of data budget allocation  UNCROC 97/03 2 
 Youth suicide  UNCROC 97 2 
 Young Persons and their Families Bill (No 6) UNCROC 97/03 2 
 Strengthening OCC  UNCROC 97/03 1 
 Human rights training Corrections Department CAT 09  2 
 Inspections Ombudsman concerning double 
bunking  
CAT 09  1 
 Incorporation non-refoulement in Immigration 
Act 2009 
CAT 04 - 
 Repeal FSA 2004 
 Over-representation of Māori in prison  
CERD 04/ 07 
CERD 07 
7 
1 
 Introduction of paid parental leave  
 Withdrawal reservation CEDAW concerning 
women in armed forces [private members' Bill]   
CEDAW 94/98  
CEDAW 94/98 
6 
4 
The tables show that the majority of effective COs were from the UNCROC Committee. This is 
not surprising in light of the UNCROC Work Programme which primarily outlined measures taken 
as a result of the COs in relation to the withdrawal of reservations, age inconsistencies and corporal 
punishment. The reservations were "key items" and received "high priority".110 In addition, as the 
previous Part showed, there has been more lobbying on the basis of UNCROC by NGOs and the 
OCC. The UNCROC and the COs were also deliberately used by NGOs to inform their advocacy, 
and used as an awareness, information and lobbying tool. As will be explained in the next section, 
MYA officials also had more interest in and commitment towards UNCROC and addressing COs. 
They were dedicated to working on the issues, and the UNCROC and COs were used to advance the 
children's agenda and to secure political support via the UNCROC Work Programme. 
There are also several CAT Committee COs that have been effective. There are several factors 
that could have contributed to this. First, as was argued before, one important reason for the 
  
110  Ministry of Youth Development [MYD] UNCROC: 2008 Reporting (Summary Document, 2008) at 6. 
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heightened attention given to CAT and the COs was the ratification of OPCAT on 14 March 2007. 
Interviewees observed that the ratification of OPCAT made a big difference in New Zealand 
because of the establishment of NPMs that monitor places of detention in light of OPCAT. The 
annual OPCAT report 2012 observed "positive impacts and practical improvements as the result of 
monitoring".111 It could be argued that the NPMs with their regular roundtable meetings facilitate 
follow-ups to CAT COs as well.  
III EXPLAINING THE (IN)EFFECTIVENESS OF COs 
A Factors Related to the TB System  
It was argued by several interviewees that the COs only have an impact and are only effective 
when the TBs are credible. Some government officials held that only a small minority of TB 
members are competent and knowledgeable.112 The criticism was directed at all TBs across the 
board, although some committees or sessions were considered better than others.113 Several aspects 
were mentioned that especially undermine the credibility and authority of the TBs and also explain 
why often hardly any notice is taken of COs.  
First, the factual mistakes and inaccuracies in some of the COs were mentioned. The CAT COs 
1998, for example, recommended the completion of an investigation into the events at Mangaroa 
Prison, but this had already been completed and the results were annexed to the 1997 State report. 
The Committee expressed regret for this mistake.114 At other times, the TBs have been more 
reluctant to allow for the correction of these factual inaccuracies.115 An NGO representative also 
noted that some UNCROC COs 2011 were plainly incorrect. An example was the concern that "the 
judiciary uses a punitive approach more often than a restorative approach".  
A second aspect was the over-reliance on NGO input without giving due consideration to the 
alternative viewpoints of the Government. Both government officials and NGO representatives 
  
111  NZHRC Monitoring Places of Detention, above n 46, at 2. 
112  Some government officials held that the criticism should be directed at the member States that nominate and 
elect TB experts and also provide the TB's resources.  
113  The sessions and committees that were considered better or above average were ICCPR 2002 and ICCPR 
2010, UNCROC 2003 and CAT 2004 and 2009 (as they had more technical experts and detailed questioning 
on more practical matters). Government officials were more critical about CERD 2005, CEDAW 2003 and 
2007 and especially ICESCR 2003 and 2012 and CERD 2002. 
114  Third periodic reports of States parties due in 1999, above n 99, at [38]; Second Periodic Report of New 
Zealand (continued) CAT/C/SR.334 (1998) at [4]. 
115  One example mentioned was the ICESCR CO 2012, which held that discrimination against persons with 
disabilities in relation to the provision of accommodation is not explicitly prohibited, although this is 
provided for in the Human Rights Act 1993 and there is case law on point as well: Concluding observations 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: New Zealand E/C.12/NZL/CO/3 (2012) at [13]. 
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noted the elevated influence of NGOs on the Committees' questions and COs. NGO representatives 
were obviously content with this. Government officials, however, were rather critical about TBs, 
primarily criticising the use of NGO information without verification. A lot of questions and COs 
came from NGOs who were said to have used incorrect or outdated information. The internal MWA 
briefing about the CEDAW COs 2007 hence stated that "some criticism … is unbalanced. In 
particular, some of the criticism gives undue weight to the input of non-governmental organisations 
without any supporting evidence."116  
Third, interviewees noted the plain misunderstanding of the domestic context visible in the 
questions of TBs and their COs. Although government officials acknowledged that the amount of 
reading is considerable, they expressed their disappointment in the inadequate preparation on the 
part of the TBs. Almost all government officials lamented the complete lack of understanding of the 
committees, with some individual exceptions regarding the structure and make-up of New Zealand's 
society and its democratic processes. Don MacKay, the former Deputy Secretary of MFAT and 
Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, who was part of the delegation in 2003 (CEDAW) 
and head of the delegation in 2007 (CERD) and 2009 (CAT), argued that TBs do not have the 
background or expertise to deal with "huge policy issues" that have "huge significance for states".117 
TBs were said to inadequately grasp subtle but essential details.118 Several officials, for example, 
mentioned that some TB members did not seem to understand the Treaty of Waitangi and 
indigenous issues and were under the impression that Māori lived in reservations.119 They referred 
to questions as to whether Māori need the permission of the court to marry. During CEDAW 2003 
there was a question concerning whether women are allowed to own property, which an official 
compared to asking whether there is electricity in the Netherlands.120 Some officials also noted the 
odd and irrelevant questions about "rural women".121 The COs are also said to show similar 
  
116  "Overview of the recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women", above n 106, at Appendix B. 
117  Don MacKay "The UN Covenants and the Human Rights Committee" (1999) 29 VUWLR 11 at 16. 
118  With respect to the individual communication of Rameka, Claudia Geiringer pointed to the "major 
deficiencies" in the understanding of New Zealand's complex sentencing regime by the UNHRC, which she 
attributed to limited resources and the fact that TB members are not remunerated: Claudia Geiringer "Case 
Note: Rameka v New Zealand" (2005) 2 NZYIL 185 at 196–199. 
119  See, for example, the reference of Mr Sadi to "the refusal of the Māori community to integrate or assimilate" 
and of Mr Ceausu, who said that "communities could become integrated": Second periodic report of New 
Zealand E/C.12/2003/SR.11 (2004) at [36] and [40]. See also the similar comments of Mr Caughley at [42]. 
120  Ms Gnancadja "stressed the need to implement practical measures to protect the interests of rural women, 
including their property and inheritance rights." Ms Dyson stated in her answer that equal rights to property 
were already legally guaranteed: Fifth periodic report of New Zealand CEDAW/C/SR.625 (2003) at [26] 
and [33]. 
121  Ibid, at [23] and [26]. 
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misunderstandings and are, hence, difficult to implement. The MWA briefing held that "it is 
disappointing that some of the recommendations do not fully reflect New Zealand's domestic 
situation."122 An example given concerned access to sewage systems "in rural and remote areas".123 
It was also said that the UNCROC COs 2011 (recommending that domestic legislation relating to 
children supersede Māori customary law) show a lack of understanding of the profoundness of 
Māori issues.124 
Although the number of "extreme" questions and odd COs might be limited, interviewees held 
that these "stupid" questions and COs put the delegation off. Some officials argued that if only one 
TB member said something outlandish, this would call into question the credibility of the whole 
Committee. Politicians can also easily dismiss the process, as was highlighted by the quotations in 
Parts I A and I B. Some interviewees expressed a genuine concern that such COs generate ignorance 
and undermine the other COs that were better targeted at these areas of expertise. They held that 
even if these COs include a couple of reasonable recommendations, they can and will be easily 
dismissed altogether. This is because politicians, the media, some government officials, and general 
public perception, focus on these particular COs to discredit the rest of the COs. The limited 
legitimacy and persuasiveness of the CEDAW Committee in the view of government officials thus 
negatively affects the Government's willingness to act upon the COs. As argued in the previous Part, 
another explanation for the ineffectiveness of COs is that they are often rather broad and do not 
outline a specific course of action. Because COs are undetermined, they often simply coincide with 
measures already in place without a causal relationship between them. 
B Political and Cultural Factors in New Zealand  
1 Limited domestic mobilisation 
As was outlined in the previous Parts, one important explanation for the limited effectiveness of 
many COs, especially those from the UNHRC and ICESCR Committees, is the absence of domestic 
mobilisation and the invisibility of COs. Because Parliament, NGOs and the media barely pay 
attention to or lobby on the basis of COs, the Government can easily get away with doing nothing.   
2 The negative attitude of government officials towards the value of reporting 
Another explanation for the limited impact and effectiveness of the State reporting process is the 
attitude of government officials. The process has been approached as a compliance exercise instead 
  
122  "Overview of the Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women", above n 106, at Appendix B. 
123  Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: New Zealand, above n 
115, at [24]. See also the references to rural women in Concluding Comments of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women: New Zealand CEDAW/C/NZL/CO/6 (2007). 
124  Concluding observations: New Zealand CRC/C/NZL/CO/3-4 (2011) at [11] and [55]. 
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of a learning opportunity.125 Almost all government officials interviewed lamented the burden of 
reporting, as well as the resulting duplication and overlap between the several reports. They held 
that the process is time-consuming and a "demanding chore", especially for a small country like 
New Zealand. Officials argued that the process was therefore not given the priority it should have 
been. Writing or compiling parts of the State report has often been entrusted to junior officials, 
which explains why reporting does not have that much of an impact. Coordinating government 
departments noted a difficulty in collecting information on time from departments that are more 
focused on domestic priorities.  
Several government officials mentioned that the picture was different for the 1997 and 2003 
UNCROC reports, which were coordinated by the MYA and MYD.126 The primary reason for this 
is that the UNCROC State reports are coordinated by a "population agency" with an entrenched 
interest in reporting.127 There was more interest in and enthusiasm for reporting under UNCROC 
and officials tried to give a fair picture and acknowledge deficiencies in the reports. The 2001 
report, for example, mentioned quite extensively the criticisms expressed in NGOs' submissions. 
MYA and MYD have also used the process of reporting as a way to foster "dialogue" and work 
together with NGOs, the OCC and the NZHRC as well as children and young people themselves.128  
There are several reasons for the greater enthusiasm shown by the MYA and MYD and their 
officials towards reporting. First of all, many MYA officials had a personal interest in UNCROC 
and some were keen children's rights advocates themselves.129 They tried to push the children's 
rights agenda in their interactions with other departments. Second, officials from the MYA 
acknowledged that UNCROC was useful in helping to advance domestic issues, because UNCROC 
was consistent with what the MYA was advocating for, including youth development, youth 
  
125  This despite that fact that several officials stated that they considered the process of reporting potentially 
important. They argued that it provokes useful reflection and that it focuses officials' minds on important 
domestic human rights issues. Other officials held that it provides an oversight of human rights in New 
Zealand or that it serves as a benchmarking exercise. Government officials were, however, sceptical about 
the extent to which the process of reporting realised this potential in practice.  
126  In October 2003, MYA and MYD merged with the youth policy functions of the MSD in a new MYD 
division within the MSD, in order to ensure better coordination: Second periodic reports of States parties 
due in 2000: New Zealand, above n 103, at [151]; Second periodic report of New Zealand CRC/C/SR.896 
(2003) at [36]. 
127  According to the MWA's statement of intent, one of the three tasks of the MWA is to manage New 
Zealand's international obligations in relation to the status of women. CEDAW has sometimes been 
mentioned explicitly in this context. Nonetheless, the most recent Statement of Intent 2012–2015 did not 
refer to CEDAW at all: MWA Statement of Intent 2012–2015 (2012).  
128  Third and fourth periodic reports submitted by States parties due in 2008: New Zealand, above n 96, at 
[19]. 
129  One former MYA official, Andy Jamison, was, for example, a member of the establishment group of the 
NGO End Physical Punishment of Children [EPOCH]. 
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participation and children's rights. The process of State reporting was thus used in a strategic way to 
realise domestic priorities. As the smallest, and according to some, "the least listened to" ministry, 
reporting was one of the biggest and most visible things they were required to do. The UNCROC 
and the COs gave leverage and strengthened policy arguments, were some of the tools used to 
achieve concrete changes, but also served to stimulate a wider understanding of children's rights and 
to develop a framework for considering them in policy-making.130 The UNCROC Work Programme 
was primarily driven from the bottom-up by government officials. A number of interviewees noted 
the lower priority given to UNCROC and reporting, since responsibility for UNCROC shifted from 
the MYD to the MSD in 2008.131  
3 Complacency in an ideal human rights situation  
Several interviewees argued that there is a genuine aspiration to act in accordance with 
international law and that this favours compliance with COs. In New Zealand there is a true 
commitment to multilateralism and an internationalising impulse to be part of the wider world.132 
New Zealand (and especially Labour Party) politicians emphasise their internationalist tradition. 
They like to see themselves as the "good international citizen" and wish to act in accordance with 
international law. There is real pride in New Zealand at being part of and contributing to advances 
in the international legal system, such as the International Court of Justice judgments relating to 
nuclear weapons.133 The Government highlighted, for example, that "New Zealand was one of a 
small number of States which presented concrete proposals to include 'respect for' and 'the 
  
130  MYA took several initiatives to improve the integration of UNCROC in governmental processes and has 
used the process of reporting as a basis for doing so: Second periodic reports of States parties due in 2000: 
New Zealand, above n 103, at [108]. 
131  Interviewees argued that reporting is approached more as a compliance exercise, in line with the other 
treaties. Another difference with the 2000 State report was that the former was a big publication that was 
disseminated widely, while the 2008 State report was merely put online. Interviewees considered that 
although MYD is still nominally present, MYD is swallowed up by MSD and does not have a high profile. 
MYD is currently sitting within the Social Services Policy Group and is especially working in the area of 
child abuse while also making sure that young people's views are reflected in government decisions. See 
Ministry of Social Development "Pathway to Partnership Steering Group: member profiles" 
<www.msd.govt.nz>. 
132  Treasa Dunworth "Lost in Translation: Customary International Law in Domestic Law" in Hilary 
Charlesworth and others (eds) The Fluid State: International Law and National Legal Systems (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 2005) 136 at 141–142; see also Hon Phil Goff "International Institutions and 
Governance: a New Zealand Perspective" (2004) 1 NZYIL 1. 
133  In 1973 and 1995, New Zealand and Australia brought proceedings against France: Don MacKay "Nuclear 
Testing: New Zealand and France in the International Court of Justice" (1995) 19 Fordham Intl L J 1857. 
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protection of' human rights as a principle of the United Nations".134 There is a strong belief in New 
Zealand that the country is playing a leading role in the world when it comes to human rights.135  
The desire to comply with international law and COs must, however, be understood in light of 
the strong perception among government officials and ministers that New Zealand is already in 
compliance with the HRTs. The logic is that New Zealand only becomes a party to international 
treaties when existing domestic legislation, policy and practice are in accordance with the treaty 
concerned.136 This means that legislation and policies are "reviewed at length" to be sure that they 
meet the obligations under the relevant treaty prior to the decision to accede to it.137 Several 
interviewees also referred to the belief of government ministers and officials that in New Zealand 
the right thing is being done.138 Many officials believe that New Zealand policy is already in line 
with what human rights laws require. The logic runs that if there is a good policy reason to do 
something, it is inevitably consistent with human rights. Former Attorney-General and Prime 
Minister, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, observed that:139   
New Zealand has always prided itself on respecting fundamental human rights … the rhetorical political 
tendency was to say that New Zealand always honoured fundamental human rights without looking to 
see whether the claim was valid. Too often it was not. Administrative convenience, a tendency to trust 
the state and the use of its powers, and a homogenous political culture with a unicameral legislature 
made New Zealand in historical terms rather self satisfied and uncritical about rights.  
  
134  Rt Hon Helen Clark "Foreword" in MFAT New Zealand Handbook on International Human Rights 
(Wellington, 2008) 1 at 5–6. New Zealand also played "an important role" in the drafting and adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with a prominent role for economic, social and cultural rights 
and subsequent negotiations for ICCPR and ICESCR: see Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act: A Commentary, above n 66, at [3.6.2] and [3.6.23]. 
135  The delegation stressed during the dialogue with the ICESCR Committee in 2012 that it played this role in 
developing the international human rights legal framework. It stated that "New Zealand is proud of its 
record as a contributor, nationally and internationally, to human rights". It underlined in this context that it 
was a founding member of the UN: Debbie Power "Introductory Remarks" (Presentation of New Zealand's 
3rd periodic report to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Palais Wilson, Geneva, 4 
May 2012) at 4 and 9. See also Hopkins in Shelton, above n 59, at 430. 
136  Second periodic report of New Zealand (continued) CAT/C/SR.876 (2009) at [5] and [6]; Sixth periodic 
report of States parties: New Zealand, above n 99, at [18].  
137  Reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand 
E/C.12/1993/SR.24 (1993) at [30] and [38]. 
138  Claire Charters argued that New Zealanders have "an exaggerated, and possibly misguided, sense of their 
own benevolence that impairs their ability to critically assess their ability to protect rights": Charters, above 
n 54, at 652. 
139  Geoffrey Palmer "Foreword" in Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, 
above n 66, at [39].   
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This view has led to a "complacency in a seemingly ideal situation", which the CEDAW Committee 
cautioned against.140  
Treasa Dunworth observed that the "internationalising impulse" must be contrasted with an 
indigenous self-governance inclination, which is, for instance, visible in the reaction to the CERD 
decision with respect to the FSA (Part I A).141 Hilary Charlesworth and others labelled this as 
"Janus-faced": a sentiment proven by a country that is a fervent supporter of human rights at the 
international level, yet which is more careful in its domestic implementation.142 A factor that also 
downplays the internationalising impulse is that the costs of not complying with COs (in terms of 
domestic or international embarrassment for being seen as "anti-rights") have sometimes been 
minimal.143 Likewise, Janet McLean argued that naming and shaming is not effective when the 
greatest amount of individual communication comes from countries with a relatively good record of 
human rights protection.144  
4 The reluctance to accept external interference and criticism 
Several interviewees mentioned that New Zealanders do not like to be criticised, especially by 
officials from other jurisdictions.145 This point of view was, during interviews, said to be 
particularly voiced by politicians and ministers and less by government officials. Then Deputy 
Prime Minister Dr Cullen, for example, held that the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous 
peoples':146   
… raft of recommendations is an attempt to tell us how to manage our political system. This may be fine 
in countries without a proud democratic tradition, but not in New Zealand where we prefer to debate and 
find solutions to these issues ourselves.  
  
140  MWA "Panui" (September 2003) <www.mwa.govt.nz> at 3.  
141  Dunworth in Charlesworth and others The Fluid State: International Law and National Legal Systems, 
above n 132, at 141–142. 
142  The term "Janus-faced" was used by Charlesworth and others in relation to Australia. Australia responded to 
TBs in a similar way as New Zealand responded to the CERD decision with respect to the FSA: 
Charlesworth and others No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law, above n 24, at 65 and 
82–88. 
143  Geddis "Which Is To Be The Master? Rights-friendly Statutory Interpretation in New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom", above n 71, at 765. 
144  McLean "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Constitutional Propriety", above n 53, at 24; 
MacKay "The UN Covenants and the Human Rights Committee", above n 117, at 14. 
145  See Wood, Hassall and Hook, above n 43, at 57. 
146  Hon Dr Michael Cullen MP "Response to UN Special Rapporteur Report" (press release, 4 April 2006). 
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Hon Chester Borrows MP (National Party) referred to New Zealand's "autonomy and sovereignty as 
a nation" as a justification for not acting in accordance with UNCROC.147 Gerry Brownlee MP 
(National Party) stated that "New Zealanders don't need to be told by the UN what it means to be a 
Kiwi. Fair-minded Kiwis will reject these statements outright, because they know them to be 
untrue."148  
There is, thus, considerable resentment towards bodies composed of countries with less than 
perfect human rights records. Hassall referred to deeply held fears of losing sovereignty and 
autonomy and a reluctance to grant the UN – which is seen by the public as "an agency of doubtful 
politics, ignorance of local issues and lack of accountability" – too much power.149 Several 
interviewees noted that intimating that something needed to be done simply because the UN or a TB 
says so is not very effective or helpful in realising a policy change.150 This discourse reflects what 
Hilary Charlesworth and others termed "popular and political anxiety about unwarranted 'intrusions' 
into Australian 'sovereignty' and domestic decision-making".151  
Charlesworth and others, however, concluded that a government is not so much concerned with 
external interference with domestic affairs, but with any entity that disputes government policy on 
the basis of human rights. The authors showed that the Australian Government reacted in similar 
ways to pronouncements of domestic courts in the field of human rights.152 This is also the case in 
New Zealand. Matthew Palmer noted that "suspicion of judges' ability to frustrate the will of a 
democratically elected government taps into a deep root in the New Zealand national constitutional 
culture."153 There is an ideological preference for and trust in a powerful government with a strong 
presumption that if the government wants to do something, they should be allowed. Matthew Palmer 
  
147  (14 July 2011) 674 NZPD 20146. 
148  Gerry Brownlee MP "UN assumptions biased presumptions" (press release, 25 November 2005).  
149  Ian Hassall and Emma Davies "The Use and Misuse of the UN Convention" (2003) 7 Childrenz Issues 34 at 
34–35. 
150  For this reason, advocates of the repeal of the defence allowing parents to use corporal punishment did not 
frame their argument in terms of children's rights and entitlements, but connected their argument to the 
positive outcomes for parents and society: Wood, Hassall and Hook, above n 43, at 57. 
151  This anxiety was said to be present among the higher levels of the Australian judiciary and executive. In 
New Zealand, the judiciary is relatively open to international law and government officials seem less 
sceptical and more receptive as well: Charlesworth and others No Country is an Island: Australia and 
International Law, above n 24, at 2. Treasa Dunworth also noted that the indigenous self-governance 
impulse is stronger in Australia: Dunworth in Charlesworth and others The Fluid State: International Law 
and National Legal Systems, above n 132, at 141–142. 
152  Charlesworth and others No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law, above n 24, at 91 and 
99. 
153  Matthew SR Palmer "New Zealand Constitutional Culture", above n 74, at 578, 581 and 585–586. 
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even held that there is a "strong streak of authoritarianism" in New Zealand.154 Geoffrey Palmer 
further referred to the "tendency to trust the state".155  
5 The limited knowledge and salience of rights 
Another explanation for the limited impact and effectiveness of HRTs and the process of State 
reporting is the limited understanding of human rights or the NZBORA among the wider public.156 
Moreover, as several interviewees and scholars noted, the "language of rights" does not work in 
New Zealand.157 The American scholar Kerry Hunter observed that in contrast to the United States, 
there is less litigation in New Zealand and fairness is emphasised over legality. In this context, he 
pointed to the numerous extra-judicial institutions in New Zealand.158 There is an idea that an 
appeal to rights is "a last resort of people pursuing an unworthy agenda".159 The NZBORA is 
perceived by the general population as a "drunk drivers' charter" which does not "offer something to 
all New Zealanders"; or a criminals or rogues charter.160 One example is the announcement that 
aggrieved red-zone residents in earthquake-hit Christchurch were to take their case to "the UN". The 
majority of reactions to this were dismissive and the residents were labelled by some as selfish, 
arrogant or "spoilt children stamping their feet" and contrasted with "people starving, wars, killing" 
or "concentration camps" in other countries worse off.161  
One might wonder whether these country-specific explanations for the limited effectiveness of 
COs are typical for New Zealand or whether they also hold true for other western liberal 
democracies. Similar research showed that the first three factors listed above are also present in the 
  
154 Matthew SR Palmer "New Zealand Constitutional Culture", above n 74, at 565 and 575–576. 
155  Geoffrey Palmer as cited in Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, above n 
66, at [39].  
156  Education in schools on human rights is limited. In addition, Butler and Butler held that "Bill[s] of Rights 
do not rate here": Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, above n 66, at [2]–
[3]. 
157  Claire Charters referred to the inheritance of the unwritten constitution and the dislike of the Treaty of 
Waitangi as possible explanations: Charters, above n 54, at 652. 
158  Kerry L Hunter "American Constitutionalism an Impediment to the Pursuit of Fairness? Lessons from New 
Zealand Political Culture" (2009) 5 Policy Quarterly 44. 
159  Wood, Hassall and Hook, above n 43, at 55. 
160  Cooper and others, above n 31, at [53]. See also Andrew Butler "Judicial Review, Human Rights and 
Democracy" in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and 
International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 47; Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act: A Commentary, above n 66, at [35.9.2]. 
161  See the reactions to the announcement at Lois Cairns "Red-zone residents threaten UN action" Stuff (10 
June 2012) <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
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Netherlands and Finland, but that the latter two might be typical for New Zealand only.162 In the 
Netherlands and Finland, human rights are invoked by a wide range of actors and have become an 
integral part of the domestic political decision-making process. Moreover, human rights are part of a 
popularised discourse and are valued positively by the population. Politicians, journalists and 
columnists all talk about human rights in a favourable way and human rights experts are treated as 
"doing something good" by "always being on the side of the weak ones".163 In the Netherlands and 
Finland, government officials, judges and the great majority of the public are also accustomed to 
(and accept that) political and legal decision-making is constrained by international and European 
law, especially European Union (EU) and ECHR law. Likewise, even courts in the United Kingdom 
have been more willing than their New Zealand counterparts to adjust the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty on the basis of the United Kingdom's membership of the EU and ECHR.164 The 
difference between New Zealand and these European countries can primarily be explained by the 
absence of a truly effective external check for New Zealand in line with the ECHR and ECTHR. 
The Finnish experience illustrates that it was the rather late ratification of the ECHR in 1990 that 
was a "turning point" and led to a growing profile and culture of human rights with increased 
attention paid by both the Government and Parliament to European human rights.165 An effective 
external check for New Zealand is, however, not foreseeable in the near future since the 
ineffectiveness of the UN human rights TBs seems inherent in the system (Part III A).166  
  
162  Krommendijk "Just 'a little UN Committee' or important policy driver? The impact and effectiveness of the 
CEDAW Committee in New Zealand", above n 1; and Krommendijk "The Impact and Effectiveness of 
State Reporting under the Women's Convention: The Case of the Netherlands" in Ingrid Westendorp (ed) 
The Women's Convention Turned 30: Achievements, Setbacks, and Prospects (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2012) 
487. 
163  These statements were made in relation to Finland, but equally apply to the Netherlands: Miia Halme-
Tuomisaari Human Rights in Action (Helsinki University Printing House, Helsinki, 2008) at 4 and 9. 
164  Hon Sir Anthony Mason "Human Rights: Interpretation, Declarations of Inconsistency and the Limits of 
Judicial Power" (2011) 9 NZJPIL 1 at 5. 
165  Finland only acceded to the ECHR in 1990, though it had been a party to several HRTs since the early 
1970s. Until Finland's ratification of ECHR, human rights awareness was limited and lower than the other 
Nordic countries that were already a party to the ECHR: Allan Rosas "Finland" in Robert Blackburn and 
Jörg Polakiewicz (eds) Fundamental Rights in Europe: The European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Member States, 1950–2000 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 289 at 311; Juha Lavapuro, Tuomas 
Ojanen and Martin Scheinin "Rights-Based Constitutionalism in Finland and the Development of Pluralist 
Constitutional Review" (2011) 9 ICON 505 at 506. 
166  The High Commissioner for Human Rights observed in 2006 that:  
… governments frequently pay insufficient attention to the recommendations adopted by the 
treaty bodies, and lack of awareness or knowledge among national constituencies about the 
monitoring procedures and their recommendations, renders these invisible at the national level. 
– Concept Paper on the High Commissioner's Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body: Report by the 
Secretariat HRI/MC/2006/2 (2006) at [26]. Another study about the impact of UN HRTs in 20 different 
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If one finds it desirable – as the present author does – to further entrench a true human rights 
culture in New Zealand, the most obvious way would be to strengthen internal checks. One option 
would be to create a Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights as exists in the United Kingdom. 
Another more far-reaching measure would be the amendment of s 4 of the NZBORA. The situation 
in Finland might be instructive for New Zealand. Until the end of the 1990s, constitutional judicial 
review was prohibited, because of a similar belief in the idea of majoritarian democracy and 
parliamentary supremacy. Constitutional amendments in 2000, however, empowered courts to not 
apply a statutory provision when the provision "would be in evident conflict with the 
Constitution".167 Fears of judicial activism turned out to be unwarranted, because Finnish courts 
have made only sparse use of the new amendments and have hardly changed their initial position of 
self-restraint vis-à-vis the legislature. What is, however, interesting is that parliamentary scrutiny of 
Bills seems to have become more thorough as a result.168 Changing s 4 so that courts can declare 
legislative enactments invalid which are manifestly inconsistent with the NZBORA (as a last resort), 
would require Parliament to consider NZBORA and international human rights more extensively 
and build up expertise around them.169 If Parliament is doing its job properly than eventually there 
will be no need for courts to make use of such a power. Whether this also leads to a true human 
rights culture remains to be seen, but it is at least worth trying. 
IV CONCLUSION 
As this article has shown, the impact of the reporting process is far from perfect. Nonetheless, 
the process of reporting is now more on the political agenda than it was 10 years ago. That is to say, 
the organisation of the process of reporting has improved since the MOJ took over the responsibility 
for the compilation of reports. In addition, both the NZHRC and NGOs are more involved by way of 
compiling shadow reports and attending the TB sessions.  
Nonetheless, there is still no formal follow-up mechanism to respond to COs at the 
governmental level, except for the UNCROC COs 1997 and 2003. Neither is there clear leadership 
or one department with the principal responsibility for the implementation of HRTs and the 
reporting process.170 Crucial for the impact of international human rights law in New Zealand is the 
  
countries reached a rather similar conclusion: Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen "The impact of the United 
Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level" (2001) 23 Hum Rts Q 483. 
167  The Constitution of Finland, s 106. 
168  Courts have used s 106 only four times since 2000: Lavapuro, Ojanen and Scheinin, above n 165, at 524; 
Rosas in Blackburn and Polakiewicz, above n 165, at 297. 
169  Even Jeremy Waldron, who staunchly opposes strong judicial review, stated in relation to New Zealand that 
"legislative procedures have become so impoverished that another layer of review is necessary": Jeremy 
Waldron "Compared to What? Judicial Activism and New Zealand's Parliament" [2005] NZLJ 441 at 442. 
170  See the reference to the suggestion of Chief Commissioner Noonan of the NZHRC and the general 
discussion during the New Zealand Diversity Forum 09: Greatrex, above n 15, at 96, 113–114 and 175–176. 
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domestic lobbying of strong NGOs.171 This is still rather minimal, except for in regard to 
UNCROC. One major actor that is also somewhat absent is Parliament. This is a pity, especially in a 
country like New Zealand where "the primary body which protects human rights in this country is in 
fact the New Zealand Parliament",172 and human rights compliance is not accomplished by court 
order.173 Change on the basis of COs, thus, needs to occur primarily through political processes 
instead of litigation.174 
This article has shown that several COs, especially those of the UNCROC Committee, and, to a 
lesser extent, the CAT Committee, have been partly effective or have influenced a change in policy 
or legislation. This means that the major obstacles for compliance with COs, which are the deficient 
functioning and credibility of the TBs as well as several domestic factors related to the political 
culture of New Zealand, can be overcome. However, this requires government officials and 
ministers to make a concerted effort to address COs by way of an action plan, such as the UNCROC 
Work Programme. Alternatively, MPs can also take the initiative to submit a Bill to meet the 
concerns of the TBs in COs, such as for the repeal of s 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 and the 
withdrawal of the reservation of women in armed forces. Often, pressure and lobbying from 
domestic actors like NGOs, the NZHRC, lawyers and academics, is needed to make sure that the 
Government does not simply discard COs or that MPs are aware of and make use of COs.  
  
171  Margaret Bedggood gave the "long saga" of the Zaoui court case, ACYA, and the Child Poverty Action 
Group as examples of impact: Margaret Bedggood "The International Law Dimension of Human Rights in 
New Zealand" in Sylvia Bell (ed) Brookers Human Rights Law (Brookers, Wellington, 2010) at [1.02]. 
172  Hon Dr Michael Cullen MP "Human rights and the Foreshore and Seabed" (Human Rights Commission 
Speakers Forum, National Archives Building, Wellington, 1 June 2004). 
173  Petra Butler "15 Years of the NZ Bill of Rights: Time to Celebrate, Time to Reflect, Time to Work Harder?" 
[2006] Victoria University Human Rights Research 1. Others also pointed to the parliamentary nature of 
Bill of Rights protections and their realisation through "political rights review". Janet Hiebert characterised 
the NZBORA as a "Parliamentary Bill of Rights": Hiebert as cited in Geddis "Which Is To Be The Master? 
Rights-friendly Statutory Interpretation in New Zealand and the United Kingdom", above n 71, at 735; 
Kelly, above n 53, at 304 and 308. The parliamentary nature is the result of s 4 NZBORA, which prevents 
courts from declaring legislative enactments inconsistent with NZBORA invalid. Claudia Geiringer pointed 
out that questions of legislative incompatibility with NZBORA or human rights often go beyond a pure 
legal analysis. Courts are often unwilling to undertake such an examination because they are "not 
comfortable with being placed in the role of critic of the legislative branch": Claudia Geiringer "On a Road 
to Nowhere: Implied Declaration of Inconsistency and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" (2009) 40 
VUWLR 613 at 646; Geiringer "The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A Critical 
Examination of R v Hansen", above n 60, at 70–71; Geddis "The Comparative Irrelevance of the NZBORA 
to Legislative Practice", above n 54, at 481. 
174  David Erdos "Judicial Culture and the Politicolegal Opportunity Structure: Explaining Bill of Rights Legal 
Impact in New Zealand" (2009) 34 Law and Social Inquiry 95 at 117. 
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